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"Meta" discussions in philosophy are a bit like the media talking 
about the media, Le.. they are prone to generating a lot of heat and 
seldom any light. On the other hand, more "disciplined" exegetical 
efforts have a way of implicitly taking stances on macro-interpretive 
issues, with the defect of being assumed and hence not argued for. 
With these twin dangers in mind, I propose to examine the motiva­
tions of the thinkers who are currently offering up Neo-Kantian 
domestications of Hegel. I am referring to the interpretations put 
forth by Klaus Hartmann, David Kolb and Robert Pippin. I will first 
sketch their interpretations and will then show how even in the Logic 
Hegel disallows for the thought/ object dualism which so stubbornly 
clings to their interpretations. Next, I will argue that Hegel implicates 
the reader in the system and thereby provides hermeneutical guid­
ance. (I will argue that Hartmannian approaches are accotmted for in 
the Unhappy Consciousness section of the Phenomenology a/Spirit.) I 
will conclude by bringing out an implicit aspect of Pippin which 
pOints to an ontological reading of Hegel. Because Hartmann has the 
most crystnlline position (and asH isperhaps the originofthe others), 
I propose to start with his essay "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View." 
Hartmann reads the Logic as a reconstruction. It must be 
presupposilionless and so there must be a prOvisionally granted 
(being-in-itself/implicit) content which via necessary progressions 
(the process of becoming-for-itself/ explicit) acquires determinacy. 
In this manner, thought is the urnnoved mover which "grounds" 
itself. But Hartmann takes "thought thinking itself" rather literally. 
Which is to say that he sees the whole process as thought playing 
with itself. For Hartmann, there is a radical bifurcation between 
thought and reality (nature), "Hegel'S philosophy appears to us as 
categorial theory, i.e., as non-metaphysical philosophy, or as a phi­
losophy devoid of existence claims" (Hartmann, p. 274). Accordingly 
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he sees thought as innocuous: "Similarly. if one says that the archi­
tectonic is an imposition on pre-existing material. such criticism is 
mistaken, since the architectonic can be taken as an innocuous 
orderingin the interest of ra tionality" (Hartmann, p. 275). There is no 
fear of the categories imposing on nature because they have been 
developed based on the "satisfaction of reason" instead of fit with 
nature. 
We might better understand the moves he is making by consid­
ering the differences between geometry and engineering. Geometry 
mightbe said to satisfy the demands of reason (admittedly not in the 
same way as Hegel's categories) whereas engineering is instead 
concerned with empirical fit with nature. Just as geometry treats the 
idea of a triangle, so engineering treats the actually existent triangle. 
And just as Hegel's categories (in the Philosophy ofRight) deal with 
the idea of a state, so the political theorist deals with the actually 
existent state. It is important to note that Hartmann is not merely 
offering a descriptive account of Hegel's behavior but also norma­
tive guidance. When Hegel gets carried away and "goes metaphysi­
cal," it is seen by Hartmann as an illicit though forgivable rhetorical 
flourish: 
the fault of Hegel's may be ... that he makes conces­
sions to existential considerations .... thus creating 
existential bonds between society and the state. This 
move is understandable, in the sense of" forgivabJe," 
in view of historical precedent and even language. 
but cannot be defended in theory.... If we thought 
these flaws away, the account of the state would be 
more abstract, but also more correct (Hartmann, p. 
282). 
As Hartmann's essay proceeds. he becomes more candid about 
saddling Hegel with an interpretation which doesn't fit. He labels 
any indigestible aspects of Hegel as "maximal" claims which are in 
turn "indefensible." In a crucial admission, Hartmann reveals the 
criteria which have been driving his reading all along: 
We feel free to single out that systematic core of 

Hegel's philosophy which exhibi ts strictness. In that 
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sense, the interpretation presented here can stand for 
a "minimal" interpretation, or for a non-metaphysi­
cal interpretation, of Hegel (Hartmann, p. 286). 
Hartmann repeatedly says that the value of his interpretation is that 
it delivers strictness. Herr Hartmann began his essay by staking out 
the reading he is most anxious to derail, 
[Findlay] claims that in Hegel we have a system of 
affinities or of non-strict, loose, probabilisticimplica­
tions between concepts .... The difficulty is, however, 
that on this view Hegel's theoretical achievement, 
the dialectic, hinges on an irrationality, on likelihood 
and affinity rather than on strictness" (Hartmann, p. 
268). 
The reader is advised to remember terms like "non-strict," "loose" 
and "probabilistic." It will be instructive to watch how these same 
terms (and the agenda/proclivities they announce) show up in our 
other Neo-Kantians (though the whipping boy does change from 
Findlay to Taylor). 
Before I draw out any conclusions, I want to get my other two 
commentators on board. I find a strong internal tension present in 
Kolb's and Pippin's interpretations of Hegel. I sense they want the 
. purity and necessity that a transcendentalist reading will provide, 
but are more cognizant (than Hartmann) of the senses in which 
Hegel resists this imposition. Nevertheless, at key pOints I find the 
Hartmannian sympathies manifest. I will first identify those areas 
and will later include the sense in which Kolb and especially Pippin 
point to a metaphYSical (by which I mean ontological) reading of 
Hegel which they are perhaps too concerned with "rigor" to endorse. 
Kolb has slightly more in common with Hartmann, so I will treat 
him next. As indicated, I am going to first accentuate those aspects 
of Kolb which paranel Harhnann. Kolb sees the logic as the core of 
Hegel's system. He also views Hegel as doing Kantian transcenden­
tal analysis: "Hegel's logic will be a metaphYSiCS in this Kantian 
sense, a study of the necessary structure of thought" (Kolb, p. 41). 
According to Kolb, the order of Hegel's categories is systematic and 
necessary. He also depicts the movement of the categories as going 
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from implicit to explicit, or from simpler to richer determination. For 
Kolb, the logical categories develop autonomously; they are "self­
sufficient." Whatever his misgivings, Kolb lines up squarely behind 
Hartmann with this move: 
We would expect that the "absolute knowledge" at­
tained at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit and 
worked out in the system would be a definitive 
ontology stating what is real and what is not. Instead 
itis a transcendental deduction of what is valid (Kolb, 
p.87). 
Kolb, like Hartmann, is conscious of the fact that sometimes 
Hegel doesn't behave himself. When Kolb can not convincingly 
recast what Hegelis doing in terms of transcendental analysis, he too 
is willing to dismiss such anomalies as rhetorical or juvenilia (or 
both): 
Sometimes Hegel uses images suggesting that the 
universal is some vaporous force or energy or life 
circulating through things. Hegel never entirely shook 
off the rhetorical influence of the romantic images he 
used in his youth (Kolb, p. 62). 
On the thorny issue of concrete reality, Kolb has this to say: 
[that] Hegel's discussions of concrete reality ... con­
tinue the development of the logical categories ... is 
not easy tounderstand,anditisnothelpedby Hegel's 
vague and metaphorical deSCriptions of the relation 
of the logical idea to concrete reality (Kolb, p. 85). 
I think Kolb is drawn to transcendental analysis for some of the 
same reasons Hartmann is. Kolb is also anxious to derail irrational 
spirit monism: 
When I say the logic is not a metaphysics, I want most 
of all to preclude the idea that Hegel provides a 
cosmology including the discovery of a wondrous 
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new superentity, a cosmic self or a world soul or a 
supermind (Kolb, pp. 42-43; emphasis added). 
Kolb also is concerned to wean us of our existentialism-or in his 
words, our "voluntarism." Kolb is well aware that talk of separate 
logical categories is precarious, but for him there is a larger threat, 
Talking oflogical categories as if they were things on 
their own is dangerous. But still more dangerous 
talking as if categories of thought were tools that we 
make and shape at will. English-speaking philoso­
phy has a strong voluntaristic bent (Kolb, p. 48). 
I think this is a telling formulation in that we are invited to consider 
what the opposite of "voluntarism" might mean. Does scientism 
come to mind? While Kolb may not consciously endorse scientism, 
I mention it because it resonates with the profile I have been 
constructing. What might philosophical scientism look like? I sus­
pect that (like Hartmann) not too far behind Kolb's adoption of 
transcendental analysis lie concerns with strictness, rigor, necessity, 
discipline, closure and certainty and their correlate fears of irratio­
nality, looseness, contingency I ambiguity, mysticism, romanticism, 
arbitrariness and relativism. One wonders ifHartmann andKolb are 
willfully putting a spin on Hegel in the interest of rigor. But then 
Kolb tells us (approvingly) that this is precisely what Hartmann is 
doing: 
On the question of what Hegel was doing, Hartmann 
does not seem to go far enough. On the more important 
issue ofwhatis possibleforour thinking today,Hartmann 's 
proposal is more cautious and more acceptable than 
Hegel's. In fact, Hartmann is not so much trying to 
interpret Hegel as to correct him and make him 
useful today. He takes the idea of categorial justifica­
tion to be the core of Hegel's thought, but a core 
betrayed by Hegel's full system. Corrected and made 
more rigorous, Hegel can be important today (Kolb, p. 
94; emphasis added). 
PreCisely what might it mean to make Hegel "more rigorous"? I 
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don't think it means deeper. In fact, I'm fairly sure it means more 
disciplined, ie., more algorithmically rule-governed. Before I show 
how this obsession with rigor is just an entrance ramp to the "high­
way of despair," I must first get some hardware from my third Neo­
Kantian. 
Pippin hopes in his conceptual scheme that idealism can be a 
middle ground between the poles of "precritical metaphysics" and 
"thebloodless dance of the categories." But on my reading of Pippin, 
this middle ground amounts to colluding the two poles in a very 
sophisticated though, in the end, misleading way. As with Kolb, 
there is a deep tension in Pippin's interpretation. Accordingly, I will 
proceed in a similar manner. I will first argue why it is helpful to look 
at Pippin in light of Hartmann, and later I will have recourse to the 
other strand of his thought. 
Pippin is Hartmannian in that he is offering a transcendental, 
nonmetaphysical interpretation. It is transcendental in that Hegel is 
seenas responding to a question like "What are the conditions for the 
possibility of having a conceptual scheme?" The sense in which it is 
nonmetaphysical is a bit more complicated. Early on, in a footnote, 
Pippin gives us an initial due as to what nonmetaphysica] might 
mean: "Hegel is, like Kant, an' antirealist,' not a metaphysicall'ealist" 
(Pippin, p. 262). By "antirealism," Pippin is referring to the sense in 
which objects cannot exist independently. The germ for this "antire­
alism" is the Kantian discovery that there must be an T which 
accompanies my representations-that the subject's "hard-wired" 
concepts are ineluctably constitutive of experience. This appercep­
tive theme is the tool Pippin uses to build his bridges between Kant 
and Hegel.1 By "metaphysical realist," Pippin is referring to those 
readings of Hegel which suggest that there is some extra-subjective 
force (call it Geist, Oversoul, Supermind, God) existing in the world. 
By portraying Hegel as an antirealist, the locus quickly shifts to 
apperception/ self-consciousness. Pippin takes very seriously the 
idea that thought determines itself-hence the title Hegel's Idealism: 
The Satisfactions ofSelf-Consciousness. 
This apperceptive theme applied to the Logic yields a reading 
which views the progression of the categories as an autonomous. 
1Regarding Hegel's purported anti-Kantianism, Pippin tells us, "Hegel's rhe­
torical bark is worse than his appropriating bite when it comes to Kant" (pippin, p. 
248). 
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organic self-actualization. One might label this an "internalist" read­
ing, "So to ask whether the fundamental elements of OUI cone tual 
scheme are true is to ask if they' agree with themselves' or p:: e d 
from the se1f-,d~termining power,ofth~N otion itself , (Pippin. p. ~4~). 
When ,de~~nbmg thou~~~. (notion~ty) Pippin cOnsistently uses 
terms like autonomous, mternal, self-determination" and "sel£­
grounded." B~t these terms ha,ve a cash value only if they are 
understood With reference to theIr correlates (Le., externality, other­
wise determined or grounded). This is the key ambiguity inPippin • s 
interpretation. 
The very term, "conceptual scheme," suggests a subject who 
employs it and an object realm to which it is applied. I sense that 
Pippin would not appreciate this formulation, but I'm wondering if 
he isn't trading on our intuitions regarding the meaning(s) of this 
term, Ludwig Siep, in a review of Pippin's book, suggests that this is 
ind eed how Pippin is understanding" conceptual scheme": "It looks 
as ifhe [Pippin] still understands the conceptual scheme as a means 
of reference to extra-subjective and extra-conceptual reality." He 
later adds, "Hegel at the end of the Logic claims to have shown once 
and for all that there is no 'outside' and no . other' for the self­
determination of the concept" (Siep, pp. 74-75). 
The crucial queslion facing Pippin is, "Is there any meaningful 
sense in which we can speak of an 'outside' to the scheme?" Ifnot, 
then talk of schemes becomes misleading. My sense is that the term 
was chosen with care and that Pippin is not in a hurry to relinquish 
it. It is a piece of hardware he needs to make a clean distinction 
between thought and object (between the necessary, rule governed 
behavior of the notion, on the one hand, and mere externality, on the 
other). This leads us to the question of why Pippin would be 
interested in a bifurcation between thought and object in the first 
place. This brings us back to Hartmann and Kolb. In their cases, I 
pointed out that by their own admissions, they were subverting 
Hegel in the interest of "rigor." I suspect and will now attempt to 
show, that a similar motive is behind Pippin's Kantian reading. 
Motivations are a very difficult thing to get our hands on, but 
Pippin provides us some indication in the text. He ini~ally justi~es 
his Neo-Kantian approach "with the hope that there IS some pllllo­
sophically useful payoff in reading Hegel so intensely in the light of 
Kant's actual project" (Pippin, p. 7; emphasis added). Pippin also 
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appears to be aware of the sense in which his interpretation doesn't 
accordwith Hegel's ambitions, "Ibelieve that Hegel's texts [have] the 
resources for reacting him this way without anachronism, and with 
philosophical merit, but it is certainly true that Hegel himself seems 
oftenmuch more ambitious about his system" (Pippin, p. 259). What 
is the "philosophically useful payoff" which justifies this revision of 
Hegel? Thomas Wartenberg speculates that the "payoff" is the un­
earthing of a systematic core behind Hegel's dialectical excesses: 
The guiding principle of their interpretations is there­
fore to isolate the argumentative sh"Ucture that will 
allow the name "Hegel" to stand for an intelligible 
position on contemporary philosophic issues. For this 
reason they seek to unveil the "rational core" behind 
the "mystifying shell" of Hegel's idealism 
(Wartenberg, p. 121). 
I think this impulse also stands behind Pippin's polemics against 
spirit monism. He, like Hartmann and Kolb, uses terms like psychol­
ogy, pre-critical. romantic, pragmatic. existential, mysterious, loose, 
ambiguous, arbitrary, etc. when he is denigrating metaphYSical 
readings. 
Hartmann. Kolb and Pippi n are uni ted in that they are all 0 ffed ng 
interpretations of Hegel which see him as answering Kantian tnm­
scendental questions as opposed to ontological questions. They also 
are similar in their recognition that Hegel himself would not counte­
nance their readings and finally. their interpretations are driven by 
an urge to find strictness, rigor and discipline in HegeL I am going to 
argue that in their zeal for necessity they are driven to a formalism 
characteristic of what Hegel called the "understanding." This fixa­
tion with rigor, "cannot see when it has reached its limit; nor, if it has 
transgressed that limit does it perceive that it is in a sphere where the 
categories of understanding, which it still continues rudely to apply, 
have lost all authority" (Logic, p. 289). I will now consider how welt 
their interpretation accords with Hegel's texts. 
In surveying some of the recent Hegel scholarship, one notices 
how contentious the issue of relation amongst Hegel's texts is. In fact, 
the choice of which Hegelian text is primary goes a long way towards 
determining one's stances on a whole host of macro-interpretive 
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issues. Accordingly. most N eo-Kantians see the Logic as the primary 
text (the others are merely derivative applications of the dialectical 
method). The Logic also is (conveniently) the easiest text to view 
through a Kantianlens. So as not to construct a straw man, I will show 
how even in the Logic (esp. the Doctrine of the Notion) their reading 
leaves key moves Wlaccounted for. 
Toward the end of the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel is more circum­
spect on the issue of contingency than our N eo-Kantians would have 
us believe: "we must guard against being so far misled by a well 
meant endeavor after rational knowledge, as to try to exhibit the 
necessity of phenomena which are marked by a decided contin­
gency" (Logic, p. 206).2 What I am interested in taking issue with is the 
formalism which stands behind their desire for rigor. On this ques­
tion Hegel has much to say. In the beginning of the Doctrine of the 
Notion, Hegel chastises those who would posita Platonic-like bifur­
cation between logical forms and the content to which they apply: 
The Logic of the Notion is usually treated as a science 
of form only, and understood to deal with the form of 
notion, judgement and syllogism as form, without in 
the least touching the question whether anything is 
true. The answer to that question is supposed to 
depend on the content only. If the logical forms of the 
notion were really dead and inert receptacles of con­
ceptions and thoughts, careless of what they con­
tained, knowledge about them would be an idle curi­
osity which the truth might dispense with. On the 
contrary they really are, as forms of the notion, the 
vital spirit of the actual world (Logic, p. 226). 
Hartmann's portrayal of thought as "innocuous" or as a "luxury" 
simply does not comport with either the spirit or (as we see here) the 
letter of Hegel's writings. For Hegel, the Idea (the culmination of his 
system) is defined as the unity of subject and object, of the ideal and 
the real. of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body (Logic, pp. 276~ 
77). Externality, particularity and contingency are preserved in the 
2Here Hegel is simply reiterating Aristotle's guidance from the Nico11l11chean 
Ethics, "it is the mark ofan educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits" (Aristotle, pp. 24-261094b). 
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reconciliation-not abstractly negated. Itis for this reason that Hegel 
has a home for existentialists in his system. An interpretation which 
reintroduces a cleavage between thought and existence we might 
tentatively name "Kantian dualism." Pippin refers to it as "the 
problem of 'returning' to the empirical world, once one rejects 
empiricism or a naturalist realism in favor of original, constitutive 
conditions" (Pippin, p. 259). I submit that here Pippin (through his 
interpretation) is foisting Kant's problem onto Hegel. Hegel remon­
strates ad n.auseam on the incorrigible urge to indulge the "Either-Or" 
of the Understanding, 
the Logic of Understanding ... believes thought to be 
a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objec­
tive fact, which confronts thought. to have a separate 
andpermanentbeing. But this dualism is a half-truth: 
and there is a want of intelligence in the procedure 
which at once accepts. without inquiring into their 
origin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity 
(Logic, p. 255). 
This is all a rather long winded way of saying Hegel has some­
thing to say on hermeneutical issues. I submit that the context which 
informs (en-forms) the Logic is thoroughgoing. Another way of 
evincing this feature is to ask the question. "Is the meaning of the 
categories in the Logic exhaustively defined by their place in the 
dialectical process?" Is the Logic an enclosed architectonic of words 
and ideas which then stand in opposition to externality? [Pippin's 
"unreal" particulars] (Pippin, p. 236). On my view. it is not. I read the 
Logic as part of a system which exhibits a thoroughgoing monism. 
There is a sense in which the Logic isn't a whole but as a moment of 
the Hegelian corpus, is the whole. This essay might be seen as an 
application of this insight. It does so by conSidering the sense in 
which the reader is implicated in the system. It is symptomatic of 
Hartmann's formalism that in his approach he assumes Hegel pro­
vides no guidance regarding the application of "strictness" as the 
criteria which adjudicates interpretations. What appears to be a 
meta-textual issue is. for Hegel, subsumed in the system. 
Hegel opens the Doctrine of the Notion by asserting, "The Notion 
is the principle of freedom" (Logic, p. 223). This is notmere hyperbole, 
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nor are the political overtones unintended. I think Hegel (like the 
Greeks and against modernity) sees epistemology and ontology as 
fundamentally linked (if not speculatively identical). Said another 
way, epistemology (truth) and ethics/politics (virtue), for Hegel, 
should not and can not be radically divorced from each other. I think 
this sentiment is behind his rather paradoxical use of "freedom" in 
a book on logic. 
One might ask, "So, how and where does Hegel implicate the 
reader and provide hermeneutical guidance?" I will argue that a 
Hegelian response to Neo-Kantian domestications of his thought 
can be found in the Self-Consciousness section of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. To make my project more manageable, I will argue that 
Hartmann's Either-Or (either thought or reality) can be seen as an 
example of the inwardly disrupted nature of the Unhappy Con­
sciousness (insofar as I have been successful inbringing to light the 
Hartmanniansympathiesin Kolb and Pippin, then this characteriza­
tion will also hold for them). 
The Unhappy Consciousness is marked by a thoroughgoing 
bifurcation between universality and particularity: 
the simple Unchangeable, it takes to be the essential 
Being; but the other, the protean Changeable, it takes 
to be the unessential. The two are, for the Unhappy 
Consciousness, alien to one another; and because His 
itself the consciousness of this contradiction, it iden­
tifies itself with the changeable consciousness, and 
takes itself to be the unessential Being, it must at the 
same time set about freeing itself from the unessen­
tial, i.e. from itself (PS. p. 127), 
Many commentators see the Unhappy Consciousness exemplified 
in the Christian-esp. in Kierkegaard. I think one can find a secular 
correlate in what I have dubbed "Kantian dualism." The desire to 
posit a beyond (noumena) of knowledge is the very same quest for 
"the unchangeable"-in this case for the apriori. This is matched by 
an equally vehement renunciation of contingency-of "the protean 
changeable." LudWig Siep. while criticizing Pippin's transcendental 
reading of Hegel, also sees a connection between Christian and 
philosophical longing for transcendence: "the conception of a be­
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yond for our knowledge and desire is at the same time that basic 
feature of the Christian religion, which transfers true reality into a 
'transcendence'" (Siep. p. 67). Kant's noumenal realm, the Christian 
God and Hartmann's attempt to carve out a realm for necessity are 
linked in their construction of a "beyond." Further, the Christian's 
conception of sin is equivalent to the Hartmannian renunciation of 
contingency in that they are both a denial of the body-the a 
posteriori, the changeable, the inessential, the deviant, the messy, 
gritty, playful vitality that is life. 
Hartmannlongs for purity; he feels soiled by the shadows on the 
cave wall. These mere appearances will not deliver the stable cer­
tainty he yearns for. In this regard he reminds us of Nietzsche's 
depiction of the ascetic priest.3 Out of impotence, the priest (Uke 
today's logicians) wallows in his life inimical resentment. Perhaps 
truth is less like Hartmann's geometry and more like Nietzsche's 
woman.4 Are we trapped on the "highway of despair"-tragically 
forced to choose either Hartmann's barren formalism 01' Nietzsche's 
(& Rorty's) free spirited relativism? Hegel hoped reason could 
provide some kind of reconciliation between universal and particu­
lar, between subject and object, between the ideal and the real, 
between the actual and the rational. Hegel tells us we need, "To 
recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby 
to delight in the present" (Philosophy of Right, p. 22). 
I conclude with a suggestion. I see aspects of Pippin's account 
3 Rorty adds an interesting (and I think in this case ilpplicable) gloss on 
Nietzsche's description of the ascetic priest. "Such a person shares Niutzsche's 
endlessly repeated desire for, above all else, cleanliness. He also shares Hcidegger's 
endlessly repeated desire for simplicity. He is likely to have the same attitude 
toward sexual as to economic commerce: he finds it messy. So he is inclined both to 
keep women in their traditional subordinate place, out of sight and mind, and to 
favor a caste system which ranks the manly warriors, who bathe frequently, above 
the smelly traders in the bazaar. But the wan'ior is, of course, outranked by the 
priest-who bathes even more frequently and is still manlier. The priost is manlier 
because what is important is not the fleshy phallus but the immaterial om.'-the one 
which penetrates through the veil of appearances <lnd makes contact with true 
reality, reaches the light at the end of the tunnel ina way that tho warrior never ciln" 
(Rorty, p. 72). 
~ "Supposing truth is a woman-what then? Are there not grounds for the 
suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very 
inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriollsness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with 
which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very 
improper methods for winning a woman's heart?" (Nietzsche, p. 2; emplUlsis added). 
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which, if altered, point to the kind of ontological reading I am more 
sympathetic with. If we substitute logos for conceptual scheme, we 
can ameliorate the sharp schism between subject and object which 
plagues Pippin's Kantian interpretation. Kolb provides a working 
definition: 
For the Greeks, logos (speech, argument, reason, gath­
ering together) names that common principle of defi­
niteness andunity that makes thinking, speaking and 
acting possible .... logos is the primal gathering that 
forms and allows unity within any sphere of beings 
or thought" (Kolb, p. 57). 
Whereas "c!?nceptual scheme" is more like language (and hence 
suggests a user and a realm of objects to which the scheme applies),5 
logos is closer to a shared, intersubjective historical context-our 
collective horizon (or Geist if you prefer). And in that sense it has a 
way of gathering the subject and the object together. It allows for the 
monism Hegel had in mind. In short, I think Hegel is a live enough 
option without Kantian ornamentation. 
5 For 11 tight treatment of "concep tual scheme" ,lOd the problems it is plagued by 
see Davidson, D. "On tho Very Idea of a ConceptuD,! Scheme." 
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